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Sometimes decisions imply trade-offs that force people to accept missing an opportunity in 
the past or in the future. It has not yet been clarified whether a past miss or a future miss 
elicits more regret. In a direct comparison, Shani, Danziger, and Zeelenberg found support 
for the greater impact of future misses. In an experimental design with 216 students, we 
replicated their study and tested the strength of the future miss in a separate evaluation and 
with different periods. The results show that future misses cause less regret than past 
misses do when evaluated separately. However, future misses made participants change 
their feelings of regret more than past misses did. Feelings of regret did not decrease when 
future misses were further away. Our findings support the strength of future misses on 
regret but also show contrasting effects when evaluated separately. This indicates the 
further need for research in this topic. 
Keywords: regret, decision making, past opportunity, future opportunity, emotion 
1. Introduction 
“All negativity is caused by an accumulation of psychological time and denial of the 
present. Unease, anxiety, tension, stress worry – all forms of fear – are caused by too much 
future and not enough presence. Guilt, regret, resentment, grievances, sadness, bitterness, 
and all forms of nonforgiveness are caused by too much past, and not enough presence.” 
- Eckhart Tolle (2012, p. 127), The Power of Now: A Guide to Spiritual Enlightenment 
 
According to Eckhart Tolle, spiritual teacher and author, the constant need of the 
mind to remember the past and to think about the future is the main factor that prevents us 
from experiencing inner peace and personal happiness. It is in fact a very special ability that 
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is still assumed to be a unique ability in which only humans can excel (Cheke & Clayton, 
2010; Roberts, 2002). Even though it is responsible for emotional ups and downs, such as 
joy or regret, and prevents us from experiencing this inner peace, it still has a positive 
aspect as it drives us to constantly improve and learn from our successes and mistakes 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). This, in turn, increases the quality of future 
decisions and enables overall improved living conditions (Zeelenberg, 1999).  
Decisions that every person has to make, such as those involving career, private life, 
or even leisure time, can be a strong emotional experience. This includes feelings about the 
respective decision, such as fear, anxiety about the consequences, and regarding the 
expectations about feelings that may occur after the outcome, such as relief or sadness. Of 
all the emotions a person can experience, regret has received the most attention in past 
research (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) proved this by 
collecting academic publications on the topic of regret from 1945 to 2005, and they 
concluded that from the 1990s, publications on this topic increased dramatically. This 
clearly shows an increased interest in regret over the last decades. 
One reason for the increased interest is that regret has a significant influence on 
decision-making. It is therefore one of the most frequently experienced emotions in human 
emotional life and especially occurs when individuals hold themselves personally 
responsible for the undesirable outcome (Zeelenberg, 1999; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002).  
This study aims to shed further light on the findings of previous research by Shani, 
Danziger, and Zeelenberg (2015). As a first step, an overview of important theoretical 
concepts for the topic is presented. In an experimental study, we seek to extend the findings 
of Shani, Danziger, and Zeelenberg (2015) by modifying some of their experiments in 
	 5	
order to add new insights and variables to the current literature in this field of research. The 
overall question is whether missed opportunities in the future elicit more regret than missed 
opportunities in the past.  
1.1. Regret  
Regret can be defined as an emotion that occurs when a person is thinking about 
how a current situation would have been better if a different decision had been made. This 
negative emotion emerges from an undesirable evaluation process of a certain decision. The 
feeling leads to self-blaming for making the wrong decision and a desire to reverse the 
prevailing situation (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Furthermore, it is emphasized that this 
specific emotion is generally not categorized as one of the basic emotions such as 
happiness, anger, or sadness, which even a newborn can experience. It is rather a 
comparison-based emotion (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005), a more complex pattern where 
the capacity to formulate another set of circumstances is necessary. These so-called 
counterfactual thoughts are triggered by negative events where automatically alternative 
scenarios of the past suggest themselves (Roese, 1997; Roese, 2000; van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2005).  
One reason regret is so important for individual decision making is because people 
take the possible impact of regret into account when making a decision, and it influences 
the evaluation of the outcome of a decision (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). For example, it is 
likely that a product will be less enjoyed if a negative outcome is connected to it, even 
though the negative outcome does not affect the product itself (Zeelenberg, 1999).  
The authors (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) also propose that regret can emerge as a 
result of two different reasons. One reason regards the decision process itself (e.g. whether 
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it was justifiable and wise and carefully chosen), and the other concerns the consequential 
outcome of that decision. Based on this, a more tangible model of regret was developed, 
known as decision justification theory (DJT), which states that decision-related regret 
consists of two components. One is the comparative evaluation of an outcome and the other 
is the feeling of self-blame due to a poor choice. The two components can occur 
independently; for example, a person can accept the blame for a bad choice even though the 
outcome was good. On the other hand, it is possible to feel regret for a bad outcome even in 
the absence of a reason for self-blame because the decision was made carefully, was well 
informed, and was therefore justified (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Crawford, 
McConnell, Lewis, & Sherman, 2002). 
Another significant part of the research on regret differentiates regret caused by 
action from regret caused by inaction. Although it has been discussed in depth which of the 
two – action or inaction – causes a stronger feeling of regret, it may be assumed that the 
time course of processing the feelings of regret determines which one is regretted more. 
Initially, actions cause more painful feelings in the short-run. However, in the long term, 
inactions will be regretted more (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Roese & Summerville, 2005). 
A possible explanation for this is that regrets arising from inactions are numerous because 
of the many positive outcomes that may have transpired. In contrast to this, regret arising 
from actions is exhaustive, as the negative consequences are already known and are more 
limited (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). 
1.2. Future misses versus past misses 
Roese and Summerville (2005) conducted a meta analysis of 11 studies in the 
research area of regret and concluded that life domains that cause the strongest feeling of 
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regret are education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure. These results support 
the Future Opportunity Principle, as they are also the areas with the greatest opportunities 
for change. One explanation offered for this approach is that regret typically encourages 
corrective action (Roese, 1997), therefore the feeling of regret will remain as long as the 
opportunities for change remain open. In a situation with few opportunities to correct or 
change the situation, processes of cognitive dissonance reduction automatically initiate as a 
way to process the emotional imbalance. This in turn reduces the intensity level of regret 
(Roese & Summerville, 2005).  
Beike, Markman, and Karadogan (2008) provide another approach to the Future 
Opportunity Principle: the Lost Opportunity Principle, in which they suggest that people 
regret mostly those opportunities where they no longer have the opportunity for change. 
They concluded that future opportunity enables people to imagine different ways to 
possibly change the outcome, which increases a feeling of hope, and this in turn reduces 
feelings of regret. Lost opportunities, on the other hand, make it difficult to achieve 
psychological closure because they can no longer change the undesired outcome. 
The Dynamic Opportunity Principle offers a solution to the controversial results 
from these two studies (Summerville, 2011). Similar to the conflicting results in the 
research of action and inaction regrets, the time course will determine the focus of regret 
feelings. Initially, the most regret will be felt when an outcome cannot be corrected; 
however, stronger regret feelings will eventually be dedicated to the outcomes that remain 
open to change. When examining the research topic itself, it is important to know whether 
immediate or retrospective regret is examined.  
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The literature in this topic provides numerous examples supporting the need for 
consideration of more variables when attempting to answer that question. Furthermore, 
many articles support the future opportunity aspect. For example, Caruso (2010) highlights 
that the future, with its higher controllability, gives the person the impression of being able 
and, most importantly, being responsible to prevent the negative outcome. Following this 
logical reasoning, emotional reactions to future events must be more extreme than the 
reactions to past events, where the responsibility to change the outcome diminishes with the 
inability to change the past. This would contradict the argument that future opportunities 
would elicit feelings of hope, as stated by Beike, Markman, and Karadogan (2008). In 
several experiments, Caruso (2010) provides evidence for this theory. The author shows 
that people feel the urge to prevent future unfairness. In his experiments, the participants 
were more willing to make financial sacrifices in order to prevent future unfairness than 
past unfairness in scenarios such as judging transgressors in a lawsuit. In Caruso’s study, 
(2010) the intensity levels of emotions proved to be saliently higher for future events than 
the emotional reactions were for past events.  
Another point by Wilson and Gilbert (2005) is that many decisions are based on 
predictions of how one will feel in the future event. Thereby, people tend to overestimate 
the intensity of their emotional reactions to the future consequences of the outcome, 
because they do not consider that other events and circumstances in the future will 
influence their emotional condition. They also do not consider how quickly they will enter 
the psychological recovery process where reasons will be found for feeling less regret and 
negative consequences will be rationalized. Consequently, the authors suggest that people 
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tend to underestimate how soon they will initiate coping mechanisms that allow swift 
recovery. However, the mere fear of the subjectively overestimated emotional reaction to 
the future outcome indicates that people might be very motivated to make greater efforts to 
avoid these situations in the future.  
The authors of the article that we are replicating (Shani et al., 2015) provide studies 
with results that more strongly support the Future Opportunity Principle than the Lost 
Opportunity Principle, meaning that future misses are expected to have a greater impact on 
decision making. As the article is the reference point for this research, we also believe that 
the additional variables we will observe might provide more information supporting the 
Future Opportunity Principle. However, the authors suggested further examination of 
whether the results would be the same in a separate evaluation. A separate evaluation often 
offers different results than a joint evaluation may, and is a way to further examine the 
strength of a theory or to shed further light on the factors that are important for the topic 
(Bazerman et al., 1999; González-Vallejo & Moran, 2001; Hsee & Zhang, 2004; Hsee & 
Zhang, 2010). It may be therefore assumed that the authors suggested this further 
examination because opposing results cannot be completely excluded and could lead to a 
more complete understanding of the topic.  
2. Experiment 
This experiment is a replication of an experiment that tested how people choose 
between options related to missed opportunities in the past versus missed opportunities in 
the future, as reported in Shani, Danziger, and Zeelenberg (2014). The original experiment 
gave the participant a scenario where a choice had to be made between two importers that 
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offer the same mug for the same price. One importer offered the mug at a discounted price 
in the past and the other importer will offer the mug at a discounted price in the future. As 
the participants had to buy the mug at that time for the regular price, it was examined from 
which importer a purchase of the mug would cause a stronger feeling of regret.  
According to the suggestions in the further research section of their article, we 
modified their experiment by changing the joint evaluation into a separate evaluation. The 
participants had to evaluate the importers twice as they initially only received the 
information about one discount event, and after the presentation of a second scenario, they 
had to reevaluate their preferences with the knowledge of the second discount event. The 
authors concluded in their study that people preferred purchasing the mug that was 
discounted to the mug that will be discounted and that they experienced more regret 
purchasing the mug that would be discounted. Hence, the results demonstrated clearly that 
future missed opportunities triggered more feelings of regret. Besides the separate 
evaluation, we additionally examined whether a future missed opportunity that is further in 
the future would deliver the same results and added a condition where the future discount 
would be offered in six weeks rather than in two weeks (Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Hsee et al., 
2013).  
Based on the literature in this field and the results of Shani, Danziger, and 
Zeelenberg (2014), we make the following predictions: 
H1. In a separate evaluation, future misses will cause stronger feelings of regret than past 
misses will. 
H2. A future miss will have a stronger influence on changing people’s decisions than a past 
miss will.  
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H3. Future misses with a longer time distance will cause less regret than misses do in the 
nearer future. 
For potential explanations, the participants were also asked to identify the option 
they would feel more responsible for with regard to missing the discount and which mug 
they would prefer to choose. These two questions were also retained unchanged from the 
original experiment in order to identify possible explanations and to increase the 
comparability with the original work. 
3. Method 
Two hundred sixteen students (131 females, 50.9% under 20 years old, 48.6% 
between 21 and 30 years old) from 10 different countries, predominantly in Europe, 
participated in this survey that was available online. Uncompleted surveys were excluded 
from the analysis. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions of the 2 (order of 
missed opportunity: past regret presented first vs. future regret presented first) x 2 (time 
distance: 2 weeks vs. 6 weeks) design. In the past regret first condition, the scenario was 
presented as follows: 
For a while, you have been considering purchasing a coffee mug. This morning at 
the cafeteria you see one you like priced at 15 €. The salesperson explains that two different 
importers (A and B) import the mug. He further explains that because both importers wish 
to promote the mug, they occasionally offer it for 7.50 €. Specifically, importer A offered 
the mug for 7.50 € two weeks ago. Because you want the mug now, you must pay the 
regular price of 15 €.  
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Then participants were asked what would cause them to experience the strongest 
feeling of regret and what would cause them to feel more responsible for missing the 
discount as well as which importer’s mug they would prefer purchasing (-1 = “ Purchasing 
from importer A, who offered the mug two weeks ago for 7.50 €”, +1 = “Purchasing from 
importer B, who did not offer the mug two weeks ago for 7.50 €”, and 0 =  “I would feel 
the same whether I paid 15 € for a mug that was sold for 7.50 € or not”). 
In the second part of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to imagine that 
the salesperson not only tells them about importer A’s discount two weeks ago, but also 
that importer B will offer the mug for 7.50 € in two weeks (six weeks). They were asked to 
assume that they still want the mug now and must therefore pay the regular price of 15 €. 
Participants had to answer the same questions again while considering the new information 
about the second importer’s discount. 
In the future regret first condition, participants first read about importer B’s discount 
in the future, an opportunity that they already know they will miss because they want to 
buy the mug now. Subsequently, they learn about importer A’s discount that they also 
missed, but in the past. The remaining information in the scenario stayed the same. A full 
version of the questionnaires for all four conditions is available in the appendix.  
4. Results 
We found a significant effect of presenting only one of the two discount options on 
the regret scores between all four conditions (F(3, 212)=16.03, p= .000). Post-hoc 
comparisons appear in table 1 and indicate that the mean scores for condition 1 (Past first/2 
weeks) and condition 2 (Past first/6 weeks) were significantly different from condition 3 
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(Future first/2 weeks) and condition 4 (Future first/6 weeks). 
Table 1. Regret scores for one discount between the groups 
  Mean Diff. Standard Error Sig. 
Past first/2 w Past first/6 w -.081 .121 .910 
 Future first/2 w -.766 .142 .000 
 Future first/6 w -.749 .149 .000 
Past first/6 w Past first/2 w .081 .121 .910 
 Future first/2 w -.685 .149 .000 
 Future first/6 w -.668 .156 .000 
Future first/2 w Past first/2 w .766 .142 .000 
 Past first/6 w .685 .149 .000 
 Future first/6 w .016 .172 1.000 
Future first/6 w Past first/2 w .749 .149 .000 
 Past first/6 w .668 .156 .000 
 Future first/2 w -.016 .172 1.000 
 
When participants only knew about the past discount that they had missed, they felt 
more regret for purchasing from this importer (M Past first/2weeks= -0.59, SD = 0.59; M Past 
first/6 weeks= -0.51, SD = 0.70) than when they heard about a future discount that they will 
miss (M Future first/2 weeks= 0.18, SD= 0.84; M Future first/6 weeks= 0.16, SD= 0.88). Evaluating 
the regret scores for each discount separately, the past miss elicits more regret than the 
future miss does. Our prediction that future miss would be equally strong in a separate 
evaluation as it was in a joint evaluation cannot be statistically confirmed. 
We found a significant difference between the regret scores for the scenarios with 
one discount and the subsequent scenarios with two discounts within all four condition 
groups. Mean regret scores for all conditions can be seen in figure 1. Table 2 indicates the 
test results and p-values for the before and after regret scores in each group. It is clear that 
the mean regret scores are significantly different when introducing the second discount. 
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Thereby, the mean difference is greater when participants first hear about the missed 
discount in the past and then about the future discount that they will miss (Mean Diff. Past 
first/2 weeks = 0.88; Mean Diff. Past first/6 weeks = 0.54). In comparison, the mean differences 
were lower when participants first knew about the missed discount in the future and then 
about the missed discount in the past (Mean Diff. Future first/2 weeks = -0.61; Mean Diff. Future 
first/6 weeks = -0.7). These results show that future miss has a stronger influence on changing 
people’s decisions.  
 
Figure 1. Mean regret scores for the scenarios with one discount and two discounts 
in all four conditions. 
 
Table 2. Wilcoxon test for before and after regret scores per condition 
 Past first/2 w Past first/6 w Future first/2 w Future first/6 w 
U -4.912a -3.707a -3.642b -3.610b 
Sig. (2-sided) .000 .000 .000 .000 
a. Based on negative ranks 
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Merging the two past first conditions together into one, and the two future first 
conditions into another group, we can also see that the mean difference is greater when 
introducing a missed future opportunity as new information. As indicated in table 4 and 5, 
the difference between the before and after regret scores in the past first group is greater 
(Mean Diff.= 0.71) than in the before and after regret scores in the future first group (Mean 
Diff.= -0.66). The additional information of a missed opportunity in the future therefore 
causes a stronger change in the participants’ decisions than the additional information of a 
past miss. It can be assumed that future miss has a stronger influence on changing people’s 
decisions than a past miss does.  
Table 4. Mean regret scores by order of missed opportunity 
 Mean SD U Sig. (2-sided) 
Scenario 1: Missed past discount -.55 .652 -6.134a 
 
.000 
Scenario 2: Missed past and future 
discount 
.16 .894 
a. Based on negative ranks 
Table 5. Mean regret scores by order of missed opportunity 
 Mean SD U Sig. (2-sided) 
Scenario1: Missed future discount .17 .861 -5.126b .000 
Scenario 2: Missed future and past 
discount 
-.49 .770 
b. Based on positive ranks 
 
We found no significant effect of missing the future opportunity in two weeks’ time 
or in six weeks’ time on regret. Participants who only knew about the future discount in 
two weeks did regret purchasing from this importer slightly more (M = .18) than 
participants who knew solely about a future discount in six weeks (M= .16). However, as 
indicated in table 6, this difference could not be statistically proved. The prediction that 
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future misses with a longer time distance will cause less regret than misses in a nearer 
future will cannot be statistically verified.  
Table 6. Regret scores for first and second scenario  
Scenario 1: one discount Mean Diff. Standard Error Sig. 
Future first/2 w Future first/6 w .016 .172 1.000 
 
Scenario 2: two discounts Mean Diff. Standard Error Sig. 
Past first/2 w Past first/6 w .252 .166 .430 
Future first/2 w Future first/6 w .109 .154 .894 
 
We found significant differences between the two responsibility mean scores within 
the past first and future first conditions with a six-week time distance. We also found a 
marginally significant difference within the past first condition with the two-week time 
distance. Figure 2 depicts the mean responsibility scores for all four conditions. Table 7 
depicts the before and after responsibility mean differences in each group and their 
significance levels. 
 
Figure 2. Mean responsibility scores for the scenarios with one discount and two 
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Table 7. Wilcoxon test for before and after responsibility scores per condition 
 Past first/2 w Past first/6 w Future first/2 w Future first/6 w 
U -1.770a -2.469a -1.528b -.903b 
Sig. (2-sided) .077 .014 .127 .014 
a. Based on negative ranks 
b. Based on positive ranks 
 
The overall picture of the responsibility scores is very similar to the regret scores 
(figure 1 and figure 2). When participants felt more regret for purchasing from the importer 
that offered a past discount, this same importer made them feel more responsible for 
missing the discount. When participants changed their mind about their regret feelings after 
the new information of a future discount, they were also more inclined to feel more 
responsible for missing the new discount. These similarities of the regret and responsibility 
mean score movements apply also to the conditions where the future discount was 
introduced first.  
Between the four conditions, there was predominantly no significant difference in 
the mean scores. There was only a significant difference in the scenarios with one missed 
opportunity between the groups Past first/6 weeks and Future first/2 weeks (Mean Diff.= -
.425, SE = .161, p= .047, 95% CI = .00, .85). The difference of variances between the four 
groups for the responsibility scores is therefore assumed to be mostly within the groups. In 
the matter of responsibility feelings, people seem to have different perceptions or are more 
indifferent to feeling responsible about missing the discount from one importer or the other. 
We found a significant and marginally significant difference between the preference 
scores for the scenarios with one discount and the subsequent scenarios with two discounts 
in the past first conditions. Figure 3 depicts the mean preference scores for all four 
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conditions. Table 8 summarizes the test results and p-values for the before and after 
preference scores in each group.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean preference scores for the scenarios with one discount and two 
discounts in all four conditions. 
	
Table 8. Wilcoxon test for before and after preference scores per condition 
 Past first/2 w Past first/6 w Future first/2 w Future first/6 w 
U -1.915a -2.043a -.243b -.500a 
Sig. (2-sided) .056 .041 .808 .617 
a. Based on positive ranks 
b. Based on negative ranks 
 
It can be seen that in the past first conditions, the participants changed their mind 
after they read the second scenario. First they preferred to purchase from the importer that 
did not offer a discount in the past (M Past first/2 weeks = .18; M Past first/6 weeks = .12) and then 
they preferred to purchase from the importer that did offer a discount in the past rather than 
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first/6 weeks = -.25). Comparing with the regret scores (figure 1), the participants seemed to 
prefer purchasing from the importer that does not elicit as much regret.  
The mean scores in the future first conditions, however, present a different picture. 
Participants did not change their minds when they additionally read about a past discount 
that they have missed. In both scenario sequences, they preferred to purchase from the 
importer that will offer the mug in the future at a lower price even though they felt initially 
more regret for purchasing from this importer. It is noteworthy that these regret scores were 
very close to zero (M Future first/2 weeks = .18; M Future first/6 weeks = .16), which indicates that 
they were more temped to be indifferent to the importer from which they more regret to 
purchase. This could be an explanation for the preference choices that do not show any 
clear decision making to prevent a future miss or past miss.  
In all four groups, the tendency was towards preferring to purchase the mug from 
the importer B. There were consequently no significant differences in the preference means 
at the first scenario round (F (3, 212)= .788, p= .502). In the past first conditions, it can be 
assumed that the participants chose this importer because, at that point, it was the only 
choice without any discount related opportunities. So they could easily distance themselves 
from the importer that offered a discount in the past. In the future first conditions, they 
preferred to purchase from the importer that offered a discount in the future. It seems that 
there was no strategy to distance themselves from the future miss when this is the only miss 
of which they are aware.  
After the introduction of the second scenario, the preference mean scores differed 
significantly between the four conditions (F (3, 211)= 5.962, p= .001). A Post-hoc test 
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shows that there were mostly significant differences between all conditions if the only 
difference was not the time variable. There was one marginal difference between Past 
first/2 weeks and Future first/6 weeks (Mean Diff. = -.480, SE= .191, p= .064, 95% CI= -
.98, .02). It can therefore be assumed that the variance of differences is mainly between the 
groups. In the past first conditions, people preferred purchasing from the importer 
connected to a past miss, and they therefore distance themselves further from the future 
miss. In the future first conditions, the participants did not try to distance themselves from 
the future miss and preferred purchasing from the importer that offers a discount in the 
future. 
5. General Discussion and Outlook  
The authors Shani, Danziger, and Zeelenberg (2015) are presumably the first to 
draw a direct comparison between regret connected to a past miss and regret related to a 
future miss. They demonstrated that a possible future regret could influence people’s 
decision making more than regret caused by a past miss. We tried to shed further light on 
these findings by testing the strength of their findings in a separate evaluation and different 
time variables. By presenting to the participant two sequential scenarios with only one 
discount in the first scenario and two discounts in the second, we were able to collect data 
for a separate evaluation and a joint evaluation with different orders of the missed 
opportunities. Thus, we could also evaluate to what extent they changed their minds when 
introducing a future regret as new information.  
In the separate evaluation, we find that people feel more regret and responsibility 
for a past miss than for a future miss. This remains contrary to the findings of the study to 
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which we are referring. Furthermore, regarding their purchase preferences, participants 
chose more to purchase from an importer connected to a future miss than from an importer 
that offered a discount in the past. This also remains in sharp contrast to the findings of the 
previous study. However, a future miss as second information had more influence on 
changing their mind about their feelings of regret than the new knowledge about a past miss 
did. This is informative for the strength of the Future Opportunity Principle and fulfills the 
authors’ prediction that a future miss is more impactful. Regarding the different periods, we 
found that future misses with a longer time distance did not cause less regret than misses in 
the nearer future did. One reason could be that the two periods were not large enough to 
present significant differences in the regret means. Another possible explanation is that the 
impact of a future miss is so strong that the feelings of regret remain stable regarding the 
period or are even closed to influence.  
Future research could increase the difference between the periods and further test 
the possibility to influence the feelings of regret with the time variable. This could be 
important for the corporate sector should companies need to decide how far in advance they 
can announce a discount. If customers feel too much regret for missing the future discount, 
they will have negative associations with the product and enjoy the product less. 
The preference choices showed that participants chose to purchase mostly from the 
importer that will offer a discount in the future. This was also the case when they felt more 
regret for purchasing from this importer and the alternative was an importer that did not 
offer any discounts. One reason could be that the participants misunderstood the instruction 
and thought that they could buy the mug in the future. The authors of the paper that was 
replicated mentioned that the participants could have difficulties to imagine losing a future 
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discount opportunity, even to the extent that they are less aware or are completely unaware 
of the information that they do not have the possibility to purchase the mug for the discount 
price. In a follow-up study, the authors mentioned the participants’ persistence to accept 
that they cannot return the product and get the discount later, even though this was 
explicitly mentioned in the instructions. A method to circumvent this persistence could be 
to make the scenario more impossible also for the future miss, for example with a 
geographic restriction. The mug could be a unique souvenir from a vacation destination and 
the discount will be offered after the participants are flying back home. This would make it 
easier for the participant to accept the impossibility to fix this missed opportunity. 
A better understanding of what influences decision making and what kind of 
feelings have an impact on choices contributes to the current research, as questions such as 
what elicits more regret still remain a complex and not yet fully examined topic. The 
authors did not expect a reversal of preferences or feelings of regret in a separate 
evaluation, yet the results stand in contrast to the results of the joint evaluation. From this, 
it is clear that it remains a complex and not completely answered issue that needs further 
examination. It seems that there is still more to uncover and this study attempted to move 




Bazerman, M. H., Moore, D. a., Tenbrunsel, A. E., Wade-Benzoni, K. a., & Blount, S. 
(1999). Explaining how preferences change across joint versus separate evaluation. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39(1), 41–58. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00025-6 
Beike, D. R., Markman, K. D., & Karadogan, F. (2008). What We Regret Most Are Lost 
Opportunities: A Theory of Regret Intensity. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 35(3), 385–397. http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208328329 
Caruso, E. M. (2010). When the future feels worse than the past: A temporal inconsistency 
in moral judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139(4), 610–624. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0020757 
Cheke, L. G., & Clayton, N. S. (2010). Mental time travel in animals. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1(6), 915–930. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.59 
Connolly, T., & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). Regret in Decision Making. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 11(6), 212–216. http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00203 
Crawford, M. T., McConnell, A. R., Lewis, A. C., & Sherman, S. J. (2002). Reactance, 
Compliance, and Anticipated Regret. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(1), 
56–63. http://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.2001.1481 
Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008). The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12(2), 168–192. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1088868308316091 
	 24	
Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1994). The temporal pattern to the experience of regret. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 357–365. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.357 
González-Vallejo, C., & Moran, E. (2001). The Evaluability Hypothesis Revisited: Joint 
and Separate Evaluation Preference Reversal as a Function of Attribute Importance. 
Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 86(2), 216–233. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2001.2953 
Hsee, C. K., & Zhang, J. (2004). Distinction Bias: Misprediction and Mischoice Due to 
Joint Evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(5), 680–695. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.680 
Hsee, C. K., & Zhang, J. (2010). General Evaluability Theory. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 5(4), 343–355. http://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610374586 
Hsee, C. K., Zhang, J., Wang Liangyan, & Zhang, S. (2013). Magnitude, Time, and Risk 
Differ Similarly between Joint and Single Evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 
40(1), 172–184. http://doi.org/10.1086/669484 
Roberts, W. A. (2002). Are animals stuck in time? Psychological Bulletin, 128(3), 473–
489. http://doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.128.3.473 
Roese, N. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121(1), 133–48. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.133 
Roese, N. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking and marketing: Introduction to the special 
issue. Psychology and Marketing, 17(4), 277. http://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-
6793(200004)17:4<277::AID-MAR1>3.3.CO;2-J 
Roese, N. J., & Summerville, A. (2005). What we regret most... and why. Personality and 
	 25	
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(9), 1273–1285. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205274693 
Shani, Y., Danziger, S., & Zeelenberg, M. (2015). Choosing between options associated 
with past and future regret. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
126, 107–114. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.11.001 
Summerville, A. (2011). The Rush of Regret: A Longitudinal Analysis of Naturalistic 
Regrets. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(6), 627–634. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611405072 
Tolle, E. (2012). Jetzt! Die Kraft der Gegenwart [E-Book Version]. Retrieved on Dec., 4, 
2015 from https://itun.es/de/8fTDI.l 
van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2005). On the psychology of “if only”: Regret and the 
comparison between factual and counterfactual outcomes. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 97(2), 152–160. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.04.001 
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2005). Affective forcasting: Knowing what to want. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(3), 131–134. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00355.x 
Zeelenberg, M. (1999). The use of crying over spilled milk: A note on the rationality and 
functionality of regret. Philosophical Psychology, 12(3), 325–340. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/095150899105800 
Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2007). A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.0. Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 17(1), 29–35. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327663jcp1701_6 
 
